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1 Introduction
A puzzle in public ﬁnance has come to light with the observation that even as markets for
goods and mobile factors have become more integrated, some jurisdictions have continued
to tax at a relatively high rate while others tax at low rates. Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
were among the ﬁrst to draw attention to this fact, commenting with reference to European
nations that ‘it has always been the case that tax rates have been higher in the core than
the periphery.’4 Baldwin and Krugman present data to show that corporate tax rates in
the ‘core’ countries France, Germany, Italy and Benelux have always been higher than tax
rates in the poorer periphery countries Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Data on the
eﬀective average tax rate (EATR) developed by Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) appears to
conﬁrm Baldwin and Krugman’s assertions.5 In 2003 the average tax rate in the periphery
was signiﬁcantly below that in the core, at 23 percent compared to 31 percent respectively.6
Much of the previous literature has tended to focus on declining overall tax rates in both
the core and periphery to motivate a ‘race to the bottom’. In contrast, we focus on the fact
that countries in the core have been able to maintain higher tax rates than have periphery
countries.
The purpose of this paper is to present a novel view of tax competition in which gov-
ernments are able to relax tax competition by providing public goods at diﬀerent levels.
Our view of tax competition helps to explain why core countries are able to maintain eﬀec-
tive average tax rates on capital above those in the periphery. The idea that ﬁrms may be
able to relax price competition by oﬀering goods with diﬀerent characteristics goes all the
way back to Hotelling (1929), and has attracted attention more recently since the work of
d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). But the idea
that governments can relax tax competition by diﬀerential public good provision has been
4Baldwin and Krugman’s (2004) paper originally appeared in 2000 as CEPR discussion paper number
2630.
5Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) collect data for all OECD countries, which are made available at
http://www.ifs.org.uk/corptax/internationaltaxdata.zip. Devereux and Griﬃth work with these data to
produce careful estimates of the eﬀective average tax rates as well as eﬀective marginal tax rates on capital
across countries.
6In 1982 the average tax rate in the periphery was 31 percent compared to 42 percent in the core. While
tax rates have fallen steadily from 1982 to 2003, convergence between the core and periphery rates has been
limited.
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overlooked.7 Alongside diﬀerential public good provision, governments tax at diﬀerent levels
as well in equilibrium. Thus, we propose a simple explanation for why tax rates have not
completely converged in Europe and elsewhere as markets have become more integrated.
Our explanation is that the impact of public good provision on cost reduction varies across
ﬁrms, and governments are able to use this fact to oﬀset the forces of tax competition.
Our approach to examining tax competition is related to that of Kanbur and Keen (1993).
Like Kanbur and Keen, our central focus is on the international policy-making environment,
where the set of policy options is more limited than in a federal setting. Thus, while the issues
that we investigate are similar to the problems of ﬁscal federalism investigated by Arnott
and Grieson (1981), Gordon (1983) and Wilson (1986), the range of policy options that we
consider are more limited than under federalism, mirroring more closely an international
setting. We present a model that is simple enough to yield sharp insights into some key
questions while being rich enough to capture some of the central features of the interaction
between national tax systems in an integrated world.8 However, unlike Kanbur and Keen,
our purpose is not to analyze the eﬀects of variation in country size on tax competition.
While it is true that countries vary in size in our analysis, diﬀering country size is a feature
of equilibrium in our model, not an exogenous variable as in Kanbur and Keen’s.
A central feature of our analysis that is not considered by Kanbur and Keen is the
idea that ﬁrms vary in their requirements for public good provision and that this variation
aﬀects the equilibrium characteristics of jurisdictions. Building on Casella (2001), Casella
and Feinstein (2002) describe the same variation in public good requirements that we have in
mind: “[Public goods] can be given a physical interpretation - roads, airports, infrastructure
- or ... they can be more abstract - laws and legal enforcement, rules and conventions,
standards and regulations, currency and language. An important feature of the examples
7A related idea is explored by Hoyt and Jensen (2001). They too borrow the idea from the industrial
organization literature that products can be diﬀerentiated and apply the analogy to the level of public good
provision within the context of tax competition. However, their main focus is quite diﬀerent from ours.
They have a model of a metropolitan area in which the decision about where to reside is independent of
the decision about where to work. House prices are then shown to depend on the level of public education
provided. While tax competition is a feature of their model, they do not develop the idea of relaxed tax
competition as we do here. Our focus is obviously at the country level, and ﬁrms cannot have a presence in
more than one jurisdiction. (This aspect of our model set-up will be discussed at greater length below.)
8In contrast, Gordon (1983) and Mintz and Tulkens (1986) for example, obtain more general results on
existence of equilibrium but the generality of their model precludes sharp characterization results. Moreover,
any attempt to examine the impact on welfare of changes through comparative statics quickly becomes
intractable.
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we have in mind is that preferences over the speciﬁc realization of the public good are not
homogeneous among all market participants, but depend on the individual’s position within
the market.”
To model such variation in public good requirements, we have a continuum of ﬁrms
uniformly distributed on a unit interval. The position of a ﬁrm on the interval reﬂects the
extent to which public good provision reduces the ﬁrm’s costs of production and delivery to
market. For example, in the textiles and apparel industry, at one end of the interval there are
the so called ‘haute couture’; the leading designers in the creation of exclusive fashions. These
ﬁrms make extensive use of international travel and communications networks; they employ
highly educated and trained workers; they rely on intellectual property laws to safeguard
returns on the designs that they create. At the other end of the interval there are sweat
shops that produce copies of earlier designs, employ local and relatively low skilled workers,
source inputs locally, and tend to copy rather than create the designs that they use, so do
not rely on intellectual property protection. (More loosely, such ﬁrms may even be harmed
by public good provision in the form of intellectual property protection if their intention
is to produce copies of existing designs.) Casella (2001) and Casella and Feinstein (2002)
analyze the eﬀect of an expansion of the market on the incentive for ﬁrms or traders to form
into jurisdictions (where the purpose of a jurisdiction is to provide local public goods that
facilitate trade). Their concern, however, is not with how variation in ﬁrms’ public good
requirements aﬀect tax competition.
We assume that governments are Leviathans, using the policy variables at their disposal
to maximize the rents to oﬃce.9 The governments play a two-stage game wherein each
government aims to attract ﬁrms to its jurisdiction. In the ﬁrst stage, governments simul-
taneously choose a level of public good provision. In the second stage, having observed the
levels of public good provision chosen, governments simultaneously set taxes. This order of
events is regarded to reﬂect the idea that taxes can be changed relatively easily once the
level of public good provision has been chosen, while a change in the level of public good
9Although the assumption that governments are Leviathans is unsatisfactory, in that it leaves unmodelled
the incentive structures that motivate politicians, it remains an inﬂuential approach in practical policy
discussion. In addition to Kanbur and Keen (1993), see Hoyt (1995, 1999) and Keen and Katsogiannis
(2003). The issue of how the objectives of policy makers should be modelled is reviewed comprehensively by
Wildasin and Wilson (2001).
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provision requires modiﬁcation of the infrastructure through which it is provided.10 Firms
are not strategic. They simply take taxes and prices as given and locate in the jurisdic-
tion where they make the highest proﬁts.11. Our analysis is interesting from a theoretical
standpoint because we ﬁnd a unique asymmetric outcome even though jurisdictions are ex
ante symmetric.12 Asymmetric equilibria have been studied before in the tax competition
literature but the emphasis of previous contributions diﬀers from ours in two ways. First, in
one branch of the literature the asymmetry of outcomes results from assumed asymmetry of
jurisdictions while in our work, asymmetry of jurisdictions is a consequence of equilibrium.13
Second, another branch of the literature obtains asymmetry of outcomes as a consequence
of increasing returns to scale, where agglomeration brings about positive spillovers that can
be captured through taxation.14 Our model focuses purely on tax competition and we are
able to draw clear-cut (analytically based) conclusions about the welfare eﬀects of relaxing
tax competition through public good diﬀerentiation.
In terms of welfare analysis, we are able to show that when tax competition is relaxed
full eﬃciency is not achieved; there is under-provision of the public good. In the eﬃcient
solution of our model, all ﬁrms locate in the same jurisdiction, where the public good is
provided at the eﬃcient level.15 Under relaxed tax competition, ﬁrms locate in one of two
10We are not the ﬁrst to model interjurisdictional competition in tax and spending levels between Leviathan
governments as a two stage game; this approach has been taken previously by Edwards and Keen (1996)
among others. As Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argue in their study of ﬁrm behavior, the appropriateness
of the set-up, or the game context, is essentially an empirical matter. Certainly, it seems reasonable to argue
that levels of public good provision are more diﬃcult to change than taxes and so these are set in the ﬁrst
stage because governments can more easily commit to them. This parallels the familiar argument that ﬁrms
can more easily commit to the capacity for production than prices. Then in the second stage governments
announce taxes in the same way that ﬁrms announce prices.
11There are no multinational ﬁrms in our model. Each ﬁrm can locate in one and only one jurisdiction.
We do not consider instances where a ﬁrm can avoid paying taxes by locating part of its production activity
in a low tax jurisdiction. Below we suggest how our model could be extended in that direction.
12The equilibrium is unique in pure strategies up to a re-labelling of jurisdictions and their governments.
There must also exist at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We do not consider mixed strategy
Nash equilibria in our analysis for reasons discussed below.
13For example, Wilson (1987) studies a model of Heckscher-Ohlin trade and tax competition where one
jurisdiction is endowed with more capital than the other. Consequently, public good provision is above the
eﬃcient level in one jurisdiction and ineﬃciently low in the other.
14See, for example, Kind et al (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004).
These insightful models are complicated, however, and it is typically diﬃcult to draw clear-cut conclusions
about the welfare implications of tax competition.
15Our model could be extended by allowing for attachments to a jurisdiction. Conventional tax competition
models do this by assuming that capital is mobile across jurisdictions while labor (or land) is attached to
jurisdictions. It is obvious that extending the model in this way may cause some ﬁrms to locate in each
jurisdiction under eﬃciency. However, this would obscure the welfare eﬀects of relaxed tax competition.
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jurisdictions, one of which provides no public good while the other provides the public good
at a positive but still ineﬃciently low level. There is a marginal ﬁrm that is just indiﬀerent
between locating in either of the two jurisdictions. The jurisdiction that provides no public
goods taxes at a relatively low level. The ﬁrms that locate there care more that taxes are
low than that public good provision is high.
Moreover, we are able to show that the greater the cost-reducing impact of the public
good on any given ﬁrm in the distribution, the more tax competition is relaxed. The more
the public good reduces a ﬁrm’s costs, the bigger the negative impact on the proﬁt of
any given ﬁrm of moving from the high-tax-high-public-good jurisdiction to the other one.
Consequently, the more the public good reduces the cost of a given ﬁrm, the higher the
high-tax government is able to set its tax without inducing that ﬁrm to switch to the other
jurisdiction. But there is an additional eﬀect. A higher tax in the high-tax jurisdiction makes
it still less attractive to ﬁrms in the low-tax jurisdiction. So the low-tax government is able
to set its tax at a higher level as well. This is the sense in which tax competition can be
relaxed, and becomes increasingly relaxed the more the public good reduces the costs of ﬁrms
across the distribution. Moving in the other direction, as the impact of the public good on
ﬁrms’ proﬁts is reduced tax competition becomes more intense. As the cost-reducing impact
of the public good converges to zero the outcome converges towards standard Leviathan tax
competition (Brennan and Buchanan 1980), where the public good is not provided, but nor
is it valued by ﬁrms, and there is eﬃciency in equilibrium.16
16While the impact on cost of the public good may be smaller on one ﬁrm than another, we have a
parameter in the model that varies the impact of the public good on costs across all ﬁrms in the same
proportion.
Our model follows the branch of the tax competition literature where competition promotes eﬃciency.
Tiebout (1956) was the ﬁrst to discuss the idea that competition between jurisdictions may promote ef-
ﬁciency. As mentioned above, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) discuss how competition ties the hands of
Leviathans. Oates and Schwab (1988) show that majority rule can select the eﬃcient outcome when there is
interjurisdictional competition for mobile resources. Black and Hoyt (1989) show how the process by which
jurisdictions bid for ﬁrms may promote eﬃciency. The eﬃciency promotion of tax competition has also been
discussed by Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marceau (2002), Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989), Wildasin (1989)
and Wooders (1985). Another branch of the literature focuses on situations where policy makers tend to be
benevolent and competition brings about ineﬃciency; see Gordon and Wilson (1986), Wilson 1986), Zodrow
and Miezkowski (1986), Wildasin (1988), Wooders, Zissimos and Dhillon (2002). Rothstein (2004) examines
the existence of equilibrium in such tax competition models. In a broader context, Gordon and Wilson
(1999) examine how the beneﬁts derived by government oﬃcials from the size of the tax base can aﬀect the
design of the tax system itself. Besley and Smart (2001) argue that the issue of whether tax competition
raises or lowers eﬃciency depends on whether politicians are more likely to be benevolent or rent-seeking.
Gordon and Wilson (2002) show that eﬃciency is promoted by competition when ‘oﬃcials beneﬁt by taking
a smaller piece from a larger pie’. See Wilson (1999) for a comprehensive review of the earlier literature.
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As far as we know, our paper is the ﬁrst to establish links between the literature on tax
competition and the literature on the number and size of countries. The fact that all ﬁrms
locate in one jurisdiction under the eﬃcient outcome arises because the good provided by
governments is a nonrival public good and because there are no congestion externalities in
our model. These features of our model are common to the literature on ‘the number and
size of countries’ initiated by Alesina and Spolaore (1997).17 Alesina and Spolaore show that
the democratic process leads to an ineﬃciently large number of countries. We show that
when ﬁrms are able to ‘vote with their feet’ then again the number of jurisdictions in which
they choose to locate is ineﬃciently large.
Our paper is also the ﬁrst of which we are aware to show that models of vertical product
diﬀerentiation can be adapted to yield useful insights about tax competition. Our approach
to the modelling of tax competition between governments is similar in some respects to that
of Shaked and Sutton’s (1982) to the modelling of price competition between ﬁrms. Shaked
and Sutton have a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation in which ﬁrms ﬁrst decide whether
to enter the market, then decide on a quality level for the good that they produce, and then
ﬁnally set prices. As consumers vary by willingness to pay for quality, which depends in turn
on income, it is possible to determine the income level of a consumer who is just indiﬀerent
between purchasing two goods at diﬀering quality levels in the same way that our model
yields a ﬁrm that is just indiﬀerent between location in the two jurisdictions. Shaked and
Sutton have an extra stage in their game where entry is modelled, which seems natural
when modelling ﬁrm behavior. In the present setting of competition between governments
it seems more natural to hold the number of jurisdictions ﬁxed. The implications of the fact
that our tax competition model is based on the analytical structure of a vertical product
diﬀerentiation model are discussed further in the conclusions.18
17See also Goyal and Staal (2004), who look beyond country formation to examine regionalism.
18A framework of horizontal (as opposed to vertical) product diﬀerentiation has also been adapted in pre-
vious work to the context of tax competition. Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2001) treat a local public
good and contrast eﬃciency under complete information with ineﬃciency under incomplete information.
Hohaus, Konrad and Thum (1994) and Wooders and Zissimos (2003) have models that are public good ver-
sions of Hotelling’s original (1929) model. They borrow the idea from the ‘horizontal product diﬀerentiation’
literature that preferences or proﬁt functions are single-peaked in the public good. While these earlier studies
provide interesting insights into the nature of such tax competition, they are not well suited to address the
question that concerns us here; that of why one jurisdiction would have more (or ‘better’) public goods and
higher taxation than another in equilibrium. Moreover, the assumption embodied in the present paper, that
proﬁt functions are everywhere increasing and concave in the public good, is arguably valid for a wider class
of public good than those captured by the assumption that preferences are single-peaked in the public good.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model. In Section 3
we solve for the eﬃcient solution under the assumption that taxes and levels of public good
provision are set by a planner. This may also be thought of as a ‘federal’ solution in which a
federal government sets taxes and levels of public good provision across states. In Section 4
we model a game of tax competition between jurisdictions. In Section 4.1 we solve the second
stage of the game, ﬁnding a unique subgame perfect equilibrium under tax competition,
taking levels of the public good across jurisdictions as given. In Section 4.2, we solve the
ﬁrst stage and show (using backwards induction) that in equilibrium public good provision
is below the eﬃcient level. Section 5 then considers policies of tax coordination, focusing on
tax harmonization and the imposition of a minimum tax.19 When looking at a minimum
tax, we are able to identify a ‘non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier’ for the minimum tax
both when the minimum tax is anticipated before levels of public good provision are set and
when the minimum tax is not anticipated. The non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier is
the set of minimum taxes for which neither government can obtain higher rent by a change
in the minimum tax without the other government having to accept lower rent. This is the
only research that we are aware of to study the eﬀects of a minimum tax in a setting where
taxes and the level of public good provision are determined.20 Section 6 provides a summary
and conclusions.
2 The Model
There are two jurisdictions, A and B, each of which has a government that sets the level of
public good provision, xA and xB respectively, and the tax level , τA and τB respectively
for its jurisdiction. There is a set of ﬁrms each of which is able to sell a single unit of a
good in the market.21 We think of the jurisdictions as being countries and the market as
being the world market. We now specify the behavior of ﬁrms, after which we will turn to
governments. Finally, we set out the sequence of events in the policy setting game.
In the absence of the public good each ﬁrm incurs a private cost c to produce a unit of the
19A minimum tax is a ﬂoor below which neither government is allowed to set its tax.
20Kanbur and Keen (1993) study the eﬀects of a minimum tax but not in a setting where the level of
public good provision is determined.
21This could be generalized so that there are many ﬁrms at each point on the interval, but this would not
add insight. Note that the location on [0, 1] reﬂects technological requirement for the public good and not
geographical location.
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good that it sells and deliver it to market. But the public good provides a technology which
reduces a ﬁrm’s cost of production (or delivery to market).22 The size of xi captures the
extent of public good provision in jurisdiction i; i ∈ {A,B}. The expression kx θi captures
the overall cost reducing impact across all ﬁrms in jurisdiction i, where k > 0 and 0 < θ < 1
are parameters. The parameter θ ensures that the impact of the public good is declining at
the margin as we should generally expect.23 The parameter k determines the overall impact
of public good provision on proﬁtability. Note that use of the public good generates no
congestion externalities within the jurisdiction and no spillovers to other jurisdictions.
Firms take public good provision and tax levels as given and choose to locate in the
jurisdiction where they make the highest proﬁts.24 Each ﬁrm is able to sell its single unit
for price p.25 The proﬁt function for the ﬁrm at s ∈ [0, 1] is given by
πs = p− c− τ i + skx θi , i ∈ {A,B} ,
1 > θ > 0, k > 0.
To focus the analysis on location decisions we shall assume that p−c is ﬁxed at a suﬃciently
high level so that in the analysis to follow there is an interior solution in which all ﬁrms
make non-negative proﬁts.26
The technological positions of ﬁrms are distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1]. The
(technological) position of a ﬁrm s ∈ [0, 1] reﬂects the extent to which public good provision
reduces the ﬁrm’s costs. Thus the cost-reducing impact of the public good on an individual
ﬁrm is given by skx θi . For a given increase in public good provision, the further a ﬁrm is
to the right of the interval the greater is the cost-reducing impact of the public good on the
22For some types of public good such as intellectual property protection it is more appropriate to think
of the public good reducing the ex ante expected cost of production. This is consistent with our analytical
framework although our model is deterministic.
23The parameter θ determines the elasticity of proﬁt with respect to public good provision. But in the
present model (unlike in ‘standard’ tax competition models) it is the net contribution of the level of taxation
and public good provision to proﬁts (or returns on capital) that is compared across jurisdictions when the
location decision is made. This is because the entire ﬁrm is mobile in the present set-up, whereas in standard
tax competition models only one factor is mobile while the other is ﬁxed; see Devereux, and Griﬃth (2003)
for further discussion of this point.
24Each ﬁrm must choose between one jurisdiction or the other. Our model could be extended to allow one
ﬁrm to purchase the output of another and use that output as an intermediate input in its own production.
In this way our model could be extended to consider certain types of multinational enterprise. However,
such an extension would not change the basic insights of our model.
25The price that each ﬁrm receives for the good that it sells could be made to vary across ﬁrms without
aﬀecting the results.
26Because p− c is assumed to be the same across jurisdictions, it does not aﬀect a ﬁrm’s location decision.
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ﬁrm’s production. If the ﬁrm at s locates in jurisdiction i it must pay a tax τ i. The tax can
be thought of as a lump sum tax or a sales tax (as each ﬁrm produces and sells only a single
unit of the good).
We could think of all ﬁrms being in the same industry and s could reﬂect variation in
adoption eﬃciency of the public good across ﬁrms. But our preferred interpretation is to
think of the interval [0, 1] spanning ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries, with the public good having
a greater impact on costs in some industries than others. For example, at the left hand end of
the interval we might have textiles manufacturers who require only fairly rudimentary levels
of public good provision in the form of basic roads and unsophisticated communications
networks to produce their products and bring them to market. At the right hand end of
the interval we might have ﬁrms in the information and technology industries, which beneﬁt
more from the availability of good communications networks and roads as well as a more
educated work-force.
Each ﬁrm takes τA, τB, xA and xB as given, choosing between A and B on the basis of
where it makes the highest proﬁts. If xA = xB then without loss of generality we assume
that xA < xB.
27 In that case a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to locate in the jurisdiction with
higher taxes if the cost reducing eﬀect of the public good dominates.
For given τA, τB, xA and xB (taking xA < xB) we can calculate the position in [0, 1] of
the marginal ﬁrm sˆ that is just indiﬀerent between locating in A and B. That is, the ﬁrm
sˆ (τA, τB) makes the same proﬁts in either jurisdiction;
τA − sˆkx θA = τB − sˆkx θB .
Then sˆ gives the share of ﬁrms in A and 1 − sˆ gives the share of ﬁrms in B. We impose
the necessary restrictions to ensure that the marginal ﬁrm must belong to the [0, 1] interval.
First, solve the above expression for sˆ and hence deﬁne the function28
sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) =
τB − τA
k
(
x θB − x θA
) (1)
Then sˆ, the share of ﬁrms in Jurisdiction A, is deﬁned as follows:
sˆ =
⎧⎨
⎩
sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) if sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) ∈ [0, 1] ;
1 if sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) > 1;
0 if sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) < 0.
27In Section 4.2 we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which one government
must set a higher tax than the other. Then xA < xB is just a choice of labelling.
28Parameter values k and θ will be suppressed throughout from general functional notation.
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If (τB − τA) /k
(
x θB − x θA
) ∈ [0, 1] it is easy to check that all ﬁrms s ∈ [0, sˆ) make higher
proﬁts in A than in B and all ﬁrms s ∈ (sˆ, 1] make higher proﬁts in B than in A. For the
ﬁrms s ∈ (sˆ, 1], the diﬀerence in the tax τB − τA is dominated by the lower costs brought
about by higher public good provision. Clearly, the higher is τB the smaller is the share of
ﬁrms that ﬁnds it proﬁtable to locate in jurisdiction B.
If xA = xB then sˆ as given by (1) is undeﬁned. However, xA = xB implies that the
public good oﬀered by the governments is homogeneous, and so ﬁrms can be thought of as
responding in the manner of consumers in a Bertrand price setting game. So we borrow the
usual Bertrand assumptions to deﬁne the distribution of ﬁrms between jurisdictions.29 If
xA = xB then all ﬁrms locate in the jurisdiction with the lowest taxes:
sˆ =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if τA < τB;
1 if τA > τB;
1
2
if τA = τB.
We turn now to the governments. The rents to oﬃce, rA, of Government A are given
by the function rA = τAsˆ − xA. The rents to oﬃce, rB, of Government B are given by
rB = τB (1− sˆ) − xB. From the rent functions it is evident that the level of public good
provision by a government also determines its cost; a level of public good provision xi costs
xi to provide, i ∈ {A,B}. In cases where sˆ is deﬁned by (1), rA (τA, τB) and rB (τA, τB) are
given as follows:
rA (τA, τB, xA, xB) =
τA (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
) − xA;
rB (τA, τB, xA, xB) = τB
(
1− (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
)
− xB.
Otherwise, in situations were sˆ = 0, rA = −xA and rB = τB − xB and where sˆ = 1,
rA = τA−xA and rB = −xB. Of course, for the overall game we require that the governments
be individually rational; each must make non-negative rents. The appropriate feasibility
conditions will be imposed in due course.
To summarize, in terms of their technological requirements for public good provision,
ﬁrms’ positions are ﬁxed in the interval s ∈ [0, 1], but each ﬁrm is able to choose its preferred
29Even when the levels of public good provision are not identical, the form of competition between govern-
ments conforms more generally to Bertrand competition. Sutton (1991) points out that the characterization
of equilibrium holds for Bertrand or Cournot competition if the ﬁxed cost (here the level of public good
provision) is set in the ﬁrst stage of the game and the price (here the tax) is set in the second stage.
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jurisdiction to maximize proﬁts.30 Each government, on the other hand, is able to choose its
level of taxation and public good provision but obviously its jurisdiction (A or B) is ﬁxed.
The speciﬁc sequence of events is as follows. The public good is chosen in the ﬁrst stage
and taxation is chosen in the second stage; this holds whether taxes and public good levels
are chosen by a planner or by competing governments. Eﬀectively, we assume that the value
of s for each ﬁrm cannot be observed by policy makers but that policy makers do know the
distribution of ﬁrms, and can use this knowledge in setting taxes. In Section 3 we examine
eﬃciency under the usual assumption that a planner chooses public goods and taxation.
This establishes a benchmark with which the output for competition between governments
can be compared. In Section 4 we consider a two-stage game in which policy decisions are
taken by competing governments. In this case, at each stage the policy decisions are taken
simultaneously and noncooperatively. Under both regimes, ﬁrms take public goods and taxes
as given and choose location to maximize proﬁts.
3 Eﬃciency
In this section we adapt a standard deﬁnition of eﬃciency to the context of the present model.
We make the standard assumption that a planner chooses taxes τA and τB and public good
levels xA and xB on behalf of the governments to maximize the combined government rents
and ﬁrm proﬁts across jurisdictions. Firms take τA, τB, xA and xB as given and locate in
the jurisdiction where they make the highest proﬁts as speciﬁed above. We maintain the
assumption, without loss of generality, that when xA = xB it is the case that xA < xB.
Consequently it is possible to use (1) to solve for the marginal ﬁrm sˆ, and sˆ can be used in
the deﬁnition of eﬃciency.
30In principle a ﬁrm at s ∈ [0, 1] could change its position in the interval. Perhaps it could make an
investment that enabled it to make better use of the public good. However, this possibility is beyond the
scope of the present paper, though we intend to take it up in future research.
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Deﬁnition 1. A plan, consisting of a pair of taxes τE =
(
τEA, τ
E
B
) ∈ R2+ and a public good
allocation xE =
(
xEA, x
E
B
) ∈ R2+, is eﬃcient if for all other pairs of taxes τ = (τA, τB) ∈ R2+
and public good allocations x = (xA, xB) ∈ R2+, it holds that
rA
(
τEA, τ
E
B, x
E
A
)
+ rB
(
τEA, τ
E
B, x
E
B
)
+
∫ sˆ
0
πs
(
τEA, x
E
A
)
ds +
∫ 1
sˆ
πs
(
τEB, x
E
B
)
ds
≥ rA (τA, τB, xA) + rB (τA, τB, xB) +
∫ sˆ
0
πs (τA, xA) ds +
∫ 1
sˆ
πs (τB, xB) ds.
Under Deﬁnition 1, a pair of taxes and a public good allocation is eﬃcient if it entails
the largest possible surplus for division between the two governments and the ﬁrms. The
planner’s problem can be represented in the form
max
τA,τB ,xA,xB
Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) = rA (τA, τB, xA) + rB (τA, τB, xB)
+
∫ sˆ
0
πs (τA, xA) ds +
∫ 1
sˆ
πs (τB, xB) ds
= (p− c)− xA − xB + 1
2
(
kx θB − sˆ2k
(
x θB − x θA
))
(2)
The ﬁrst term, (p− c), measures the net private revenues across all ﬁrms that are inde-
pendent of public good provision under the planner. The terms −xA and −xB reﬂect the
costs (to society) of providing the public good in each of the jurisdictions. The ﬁrst term in
the parentheses, kx θB /2, reﬂects the impact on total output across all ﬁrms if all ﬁrms locate
in B. The second term in the parentheses reﬂects the loss of total output that results if a
proportion sˆ of ﬁrms locates in A. This loss comes about because, for all ﬁrms, output is
increasing in public good provision and public good provision is lower in A than in B.
The following result provides all the eﬃcient solutions.
Proposition 1. There exists an eﬃcient plan τE =
(
τEA, τ
E
B
)
, xE =
(
xEA, x
E
B
)
where τEA ≥
τEB, x
E
A = 0, x
E
B =
(
1
2
θk
) 1
1−θ and sˆ = 0.
Proposition 1 conﬁrms the intuition that output is eﬃcient when all ﬁrms locate in the
same jurisdiction. From the proof we learn that eﬃciency is achieved when τEA ≥ τEB. The
fact that τEA ≥ τEB ensures, by (1), that sˆ = 0 for xB > xA. So all ﬁrms choose to locate in
B, the jurisdiction that provides the high level of public goods. Moreover, the tax has no
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distortionary eﬀect within the jurisdiction, as it is eﬀectively a transfer from the ﬁrms to the
government.31
The choice of xEB > x
E
A = 0 is then eﬃcient for two reasons. First, as pointed out above,
total output is higher if all ﬁrms locate in the jurisdiction where public good provision
is highest. Second, eﬃciency is maximized when the public good is provided in only one
jurisdiction. This follows from the fact that the public good is nonrival in our model and
the fact that there are no congestion externalities.
The result also provides a unique solution for the level of xEB. The solution is unique
because the direct impact of the public good on costs skx θB is declining at the margin
while the cost of the public good to society xB is linear. This eﬃcient solution will be
useful as a benchmark for comparison against levels of provision under competition between
jurisdictions. We can see from the solution for the eﬃcient level of provision xEB =
(
1
2
θk
) 1
1−θ
that xEB is increasing in k. The bigger the cost-reducing impact of the public good, the
greater the marginal value to society of having more of the public good and so the greater
the eﬃcient level of provision. The impact of θ on xEB is similar but it is complicated by
the fact that a change in θ may aﬀect the marginal and average returns to xB in opposite
directions. This issue will be taken up in more detail below.
4 Competition in Taxes and Public Good Provision
In this section we examine the outcome of competition for ﬁrms between governments using
public good provision and taxation. We will see that, by providing diﬀerent levels of public
good provision, governments can relax the forces of tax competition, taxing at diﬀerent levels
in equilibrium. In attempting to induce ﬁrms to locate in its jurisdiction, the government
in each of the two jurisdictions, A and B, competes over taxes and the level of public good
provision. These governments are assumed to be Leviathans, maximizing the rents to oﬃce
through taxation and public good provision. We solve for an equilibrium in taxes and public
good provision using backwards induction. In Stage 1 of the game, the two governments,
A and B, noncooperatively and simultaneously choose (as pure strategies) levels of public
good provision xA ∈ R+ and xB ∈ R+ respectively. Then in Stage 2 the two governments
31If we had assumed ad valorem or speciﬁc taxation then the planner’s solution would have to take account
of the marginal eﬀect of the tax on production within each jurisdiction as well.
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choose (as pure strategies) levels of taxation τA ∈ R+ and τB ∈ R+ respectively.32 Once the
governments’ decisions have been taken, ﬁrms take taxes and levels of public good provision
as given and choose their geographical locations (i.e. A or B) to maximize proﬁts. We refer
to this whole process, including both stages, as a tax competition game.
4.1 Stage 2: The Tax Subgame
The purpose of this subsection is to solve for Stage 2, where the levels of public good provision
by the two governments are taken as ﬁxed at (non-negative) levels xA and xB .
For given levels of public good provision xA and xB, a strategy τ
∗
A of Government A is a
best response tax against a strategy τB when it maximizes rA (τA, τB). A Nash equilibrium in
taxes is a pair (τ ∗A, τ
∗
B) for which (i) τ
∗
A is a best response to τ
∗
B and vice-versa (ii) τ
∗
Asˆ ≥ xA
and τ ∗B (1− sˆ) ≥ xB.
The case where xA = xB is analyzed as a straight-forward application of Bertrand equi-
librium in homogeneous goods. The case where xA < xB is less straight-forward and we need
the following lemma to establish best response taxes in this situation.
Lemma 1. Assume that xA and xB are ﬁxed, with 0 ≤ xA < xB. For given τB, the unique
tax that maximizes rA (τA, τB) is
TA (τB) =
τB
2
.
For given τA, the unique tax τB that maximizes rB (τA, τB) is
TB (τA) =
τA
2
+
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
2
.
Lemma 1 determines tax reaction functions, which are illustrated in Figure 1. We see
that for ﬁxed levels of public goods optimal tax rates are strategic complements. Government
A’s reaction function is derived in a very straight forward manner by rearranging the ﬁrst
order condition for the maximization of rA. The reaction function shows that Government
A’s best response depends only on the level of τB.
32It will be assumed throughout that mixed strategies in tax rates are not available to governments.
This is generally deemed to be an acceptable assumption in the applied literature on policy setting in a
perfect-information environment.
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Government B’s reaction function is more interesting. For any τA, the level of τB that
maximizes rB is increasing in k. To see why, look at the ﬁrst order condition for maximization
of rB;
drB
dτB
= 1− sˆ− τB ∂sˆ
∂τB
= 1− τB − τA
k
(
x θB − x θA
) − τB
k
(
x θB − x θA
) = 0.
From the ﬁrst order condition it is easy to see that rB is strictly concave. It also becomes
clear that drB/dτB is increasing in k. Look ﬁrst at sˆ. Assuming values of τA, τB, and
xA < xB that imply sˆ ∈ (0, 1),
∂sˆ
∂k
= − τB − τA
k2
(
x θB − x θA
) = − sˆ
k
< 0.
An increase in k results in a decrease in sˆ. Intuitively, the greater the positive impact of
the public good on proﬁts, the higher Government B can set its tax τB above τA and still
attract a given share of ﬁrms 1− sˆ to its jurisdiction.33
Looking now at the third term of the ﬁrst order condition and diﬀerentiating with respect
to k we see that
∂2sˆ
∂τB∂k
= − 1
k2
(
x θB − x θA
) < 0. (3)
So if Government B increases its tax this induces ﬁrms to move to A, i.e. ∂sˆ/∂τB =(
k2
(
x θB − x θA
))−1
, but this eﬀect is dampened by an increase in k. For higher k, Government
B’s loss in share of ﬁrms due to an increase in τB is more limited. It is due to these two
combined eﬀects that an increase in k increases Government B’s best response tariﬀ for any
given τA. As we shall see, it is through these two eﬀects that governments are able to relax
tax competition, and tax competition is increasingly relaxed as a result of an increase in k.
We now characterize equilibrium taxes and the equilibrium share sˆ of ﬁrms between
jurisdictions.
33The parameter θ aﬀects the impact of the public good on proﬁts in a similar but more complex way.
This will be discussed further below.
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Proposition 2. (Relaxed Tax competition). Assume that xA and xB are ﬁxed.
For xA = xB, both governments provide the same level of public good and there exists a
unique equilibrium in which τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = 0.
For xA = xB assume that xA < xB . Then there exists a unique subgame equilibrium
point determined by the taxes
τ ∗A (xA, xB) =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
;
τ ∗B (xA, xB) =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
.
At τ ∗A (xA, xB; k) and τ
∗
B (xA, xB; k), the share of ﬁrms locating in Jurisdiction A is given by
sˆ = 1/3.
We will say that tax competition is relaxed when τ ∗B > τ
∗
A. We see from Proposition 2
that tax competition is more relaxed (that is, the larger the gap between τ ∗B and τ
∗
A) the
larger is xB relative to xA, and the higher is k; τ
∗
B − τ ∗A = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3. These features
of the equilibrium can be seen quite clearly from Figure 1, which shows that the intercept
of Government B’s reaction function TB (τA) is increasing in x
θ
B − x θA and k. Consequently,
the point where both reaction functions TA (τB) and TB (τA) cross, which determines the
equilibrium tax levels τ ∗A and τ
∗
B moves away from the origin as either x
θ
B − x θA or k are
increased.
As xA is reduced relative to xB , Jurisdiction A becomes less attractive to ﬁrms that
locate in B. So Government B is able to raise its tax, making higher rents from each ﬁrm
while holding its share of ﬁrms constant. At the same time, this makes Jurisdiction B less
attractive to ﬁrms in A, so Government A is able to raise its tax and make higher rents from
each ﬁrm while holding its share of ﬁrms constant.
The fact that tax competition becomes more relaxed the greater the diﬀerence between
xB and xA suggests that Government A has an incentive to reduce xA relative to xB in Stage
1 so that it can raise taxes in Stage 2. When we look at Stage 1 in the next subsection we
will see that this incentive is further reinforced by the fact that reducing xA reduces the cost
for Government A of public good provision. For Government B these forces pull in opposite
directions. Tax competition is more relaxed when xB is increased, enabling Government B
to raise τB while holding its share of ﬁrms constant, potentially increasing rents. But of
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course this increases the cost of provision, which works on rents in the opposite direction.
The balance of these eﬀects will be analyzed in Section 4.2.
The fact that τ ∗B > τ
∗
A does not depend on budget balance requirements. Indeed, note
that no balanced budget constraints are imposed on best response outcomes in Stage 2. We
will see in the next section that when governments choose levels of provision in Stage 1 using
these best response tax functions, rents in equilibrium are always positive. How can the
government budget constraint be satisﬁed as equilibrium taxes tend to zero? We shall see
in the next section that equilibrium levels of public good provision tend towards zero at a
faster rate.
If xA = xB then public good provision is the same across jurisdictions and we eﬀectively
have Bertrand tax competition which leads to an outcome in which τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = 0. Because xA
is sunk, for any positive tax level it is a dominant strategy for each government to undercut
the other in setting taxes and in doing so attract all ﬁrms to its jurisdiction. Recall that the
share of ﬁrms that locates in each jurisdiction is indeterminate in such an equilibrium, but
because taxes are zero the share of ﬁrms that locates in each jurisdiction makes no diﬀerence
to rents; thus rA = rB = −xA.
One point worth clarifying is that in our framework it is not possible to conclude that
tax competition necessarily leads taxes to be set ‘too high’ or ‘too low.’ This is because,
while under tax competition the level of taxation is determined by the level of public good
provision, under the eﬃcient solution it is indeterminate. Recall that eﬃciency does not
stipulate a level for taxation, only that the tax in Jurisdiction A is at least as high as the
tax in Jurisdiction B. Moreover, Government B may make positive rents under the eﬃcient
solution and this is perfectly consistent with eﬃciency. The presence of government rents is
sometimes associated with ineﬃciency but, as we shall see, it is the fact that governments
compete for rents that brings about an ineﬃcient outcome here, not the fact that they make
rents per se.
Proposition 2 shows that sˆ = 0 in equilibrium and from this we can conclude immediately
that relaxed tax competition is ineﬃcient. We know from Proposition 1 that the unique
eﬃcient outcome has all ﬁrms in a single jurisdiction with the public good provided at the
eﬃcient level.
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Corollary to Proposition 2. Under relaxed tax competition sˆ > 0; thus relaxed tax
competition is ineﬃcient.
This ineﬃciency is created by the relaxation of tax competition because a positive share of
ﬁrms (sˆ = 1/3) is lured to Jurisdiction A by low taxation, despite the fact that in equilibrium
no public goods are provided in A. This result is reminiscent of Alesina and Spolaore’s (1997)
ﬁnding that in a democracy there is an ineﬃciently large number of countries. In their model,
it is the citizens furthest away from the government under the eﬃcient solution who ﬁnd
the formation of a new nation most appealing. Similarly, in our model it is obviously the
ﬁrms at the bottom of the interval who are attracted to the low-tax jurisdiction under tax
competition.34
The result that location over more than one jurisdiction is ineﬃcient is somewhat stark.
It contrasts with the standard tax competition models of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and
Mieskowski (1986). In those models, one factor is immobile while the other is not, and
increasing opportunity cost of factor substitution in the production function means that the
marginal product of the mobile factor becomes high when it is scarce. If the assumption that
one factor is immobile were dropped then a result like this corollary could be obtained under
standard tax competition as well. Other factors could be brought into the model such as
congestion eﬀects and attachments to location, and if signiﬁcant enough these would cause
ﬁrms to locate across more than one jurisdiction in the eﬃcient outcome.
It is interesting to note from Proposition 2 that for our example the share of ﬁrms
locating in Jurisdiction B is relatively large, at 1 − sˆ = 2/3, even though B sets a higher
tax in equilibrium. We might have expected to see the high-tax jurisdiction attracting a
relatively small share of ﬁrms but this is not the case. Our example shows that a higher
level of public good provision can have a cost-reducing impact suﬃciently large as to make
location in Jurisdiction B more proﬁtable for a majority of ﬁrms, despite higher taxation
there.35
Here in this section we have seen that ineﬃciency is created by the relaxation of tax
34In some situations like this the ineﬃciency disappears as the number of jurisdictions becomes large. But
Shaked and Sutton (1987) show that when a ﬁxed cost (here public good provision) is sunk in the ﬁrst stage,
the ﬁxed cost is escalated to prevent the number of jurisdictions becoming large.
35In a more general speciﬁcation we would expect sˆ to be a function of xA and xB in the equilibrium of
Stage 2.
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competition because a positive share of ﬁrms locates in A where no public good is provided.
In the next section we will see that further ineﬃciency arises under relaxed tax competition
because the public good is under-provided in Jurisdiction B.
4.2 Stage 1: Level of public good provision
We now solve Stage 1, which determines the level of public good provision by the respective
governments. To do this, we must drop the assumption that xA ≤ xB . In looking for
Government A’s best response to xB, we must evaluate rA (xA, xB) for xA < xB , xA = xB
and xA > xB.
Recall that, by Proposition 2, if xA < xB then τ
∗
A (xA, xB) =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
, τ ∗B (xA, xB) =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
and sˆ = 1
3
, and if xA = xB, τ
∗
A = τ
∗
B = 0 and sˆ is indeterminate.
36 It
also follows from Proposition 2 that if xA > xB then τ
∗
A (xA, xB) =
2
3
k
(
x θA − x θB
)
and
τ ∗B (xA, xB) =
1
3
k
(
x θA − x θB
)
. Using these equilibrium values in rA = τAsˆ− xA, Government
A’s rent function is deﬁned as follows:
rA (xA, xB) =
⎧⎨
⎩
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/9− xA if 0 ≤ xA < xB;
−xA if 0 ≤ xA = xB;
4k
(
x θA − x θB
)
/9− xA if 0 ≤ xB < xA.
(4)
For Government B,
rB (xA, xB) =
⎧⎨
⎩
4k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/9− xA if 0 ≤ xA < xB;
−xB if 0 ≤ xA = xB;
k
(
x θA − x θB
)
/9− xB if 0 ≤ xB < xA.
(5)
A level of public good provision x∗A of Government A is a best response against a level of public
good provision xB, denoted BRA (xB), when it maximizes rA (xA, xB). A Nash equilibrium
in levels of public good provision is a pair (x∗A, x
∗
B) where (i) x
∗
A is a best response against
x∗B and vice-versa; (ii) rA (x
∗
A, x
∗
B) ≥ 0, rB (x∗A, x∗B) ≥ 0.
We will now state our existence and characterization of equilibrium result, Proposition
3, followed immediately by the statement of Proposition 4 which compares the equilibrium
level of public good provision to the eﬃcient level. A discussion of both propositions then
follows. Proposition 3 shows that while Jurisdiction B provides the public good at a positive
level, A provides none at all. Also note that, although taxation is higher in B than in A,
taxation in A is nevertheless positive. Thus Jurisdiction A has a degree of monopoly power
36Recall that in this case rA = rB = −xA = −xB ; rents are well deﬁned even though sˆ is indeterminate.
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and is able to collect rents due to the fact that ﬁrms must locate in one jurisdiction or the
other in order to produce. Proposition 4 then shows that the equilibrium level of public good
provision is ineﬃcient.
Proposition 3. Assume that governments play a tax competition game.
1. There exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
2. The equilibrium has the property that one jurisdiction, say A, provides a smaller
amount of the public good than the other, B.
3. The subgame perfect equilibrium is determined by the levels of public good provision
x∗A = 0,
x∗B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
,
and taxes are (uniquely)
τ ∗A =
1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
,
τ ∗B =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
.
Proposition 4. In the (pure strategies) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, public good
provision in Jurisdiction B is ineﬃciently low: xEB =
(
1
2
θk
) 1
1−θ > x∗B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ .
Discussion of Proposition 3. In the proof we show that the equilibrium in pure strategies
must be asymmetric in that one government sets public good provision above the level of
the other. We prove that this equilibrium exists and is unique subject to a re-labelling of
jurisdictions. We then choose to label Jurisdictions A and B as before, as the jurisdictions
of low and high level public good provision respectively.
In Section 4.1 we argued that from any positive level of public good provision Govern-
ment A always has an incentive to reduce its provision. This is so both because reducing
public good provision relaxes tax competition, enabling taxes to be raised (by both juris-
dictions) and because it saves costs. Both eﬀects work in the same direction to increase
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rents. Proposition 3 shows formally that this eﬀect does indeed operate to the point where
Government A provides no public goods at all. It seems reasonable to argue that such an
eﬀect would operate under more general speciﬁcations than ours, although in more complex
models public good provision may not be driven all the way to zero.
For Government B, on the other hand, it was observed in Section 4.1 that the incentive
to raise public good provision in order to relax tax competition and the incentive to lower
provision in order to save costs operate in opposite directions. Proposition 3 shows that
these eﬀects are balanced at a positive level x∗B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ in equilibrium. The eﬀect of a
change in k is clear. As k is increased this increases x∗B because public good provision has a
bigger impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and therefore on government rents through taxation.
The eﬀect of θ on x∗B is less obvious. While for k relatively large, x
∗
B is monotonically
increasing in θ, for k relatively small the eﬀect on x∗B of an increase in θ is ambiguous. To show
the ambiguity, in Figure 2 we illustrate rB under the assumption that k = 1 (i.e. relatively
small) and that all equilibrium values other than x∗B hold; τA = τ
∗
A, τB = τ
∗
B, x
∗
A = 0 and
consequently sˆ = 1
3
. Using these values, it is easy to work out that rB =
4
9
kx θB − xB. Figure
2 illustrates how rB varies with xB for θ =
1
10
, θ = 1
4
and θ = 2
3
. We see that for each
value of θ there is a unique value x∗B that maximizes rB. Moreover, x
∗
B increases as θ is
increased from θ = 1
10
to θ = 1
4
but x∗B decreases as θ is increased form θ =
1
4
to θ = 2
3
.
The reason can be seen most clearly by inspection of the ﬁrst derivative of the rent function,
drB/dxB =
4
9
θkxθ−1B −1. An increase in θ has two conﬂicting eﬀects on the ﬁrst term. While
an increase in θ tends to increase 4
9
θkxB, an increase in θ tends to decrease x
θ−1
B (for ﬁxed
k and xB). Moreover, the negative second eﬀect increases non-linearly with θ. To put this
another way, an increase in θ reduces the curvature of rB everywhere but also reduces the
initial gradient of rB in the neighborhood of xB = 0. Thus x
∗
B may be ﬁrst increasing then
decreasing in θ. However, it is also easy to see that k may be set large enough so that the
ﬁrst term is monotonically increasing in k for θ ∈ (0, 1). In that case x∗B is monotonically
increasing in θ just as it is monotonically increasing in k.
The eﬀect of θ on xEB is very similar, for reasons that are closely related. Observe, by
diﬀerentiating the planner’s problem (2), that dΩ/dxB =
1
2
θkxθ−1B −1. We can see by analogy
that, for relatively low k, xEB is ﬁrst increasing then decreasing in θ. As for x
∗
B, it is possible
to set k suﬃciently large so that xEB is monotonically increasing in θ.
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It is easy to check that both governments make positive rents in equilibrium. For Ju-
risdiction A this is immediately obvious because it collects taxes from a positive share of
ﬁrms but has no costs of public good provision. For Jurisdiction B we use the equilibrium
values for τ ∗B and x
∗
B in the expression for Government B’s rents to obtain, in reduced form,
rB =
(
4k
9
) 1
1−θ
[
θ
θ
1−θ − θ 11−θ
]
. To see that rB > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1) note that limθ→0 θ θ1−θ = 1
while limθ→0 θ
1
1−θ = 0 and limθ→1 θ
θ
1−θ = limθ→1 θ
1
1−θ = 1/e, with θ
θ
1−θ decreasing monoton-
ically from 1 to 1/e as θ is varied from 0 to 1, and θ
1
1−θ increasing monotonically from 0
to 1/e as θ is varied from 0 to 1. This makes intuitive sense if we think of the outcome as
oligopolistic, where both governments are able to choose quantities and prices (here taxes)
at which they make non-negative rents.37
We can now determine which government makes higher rents. Using equilibrium values
from Proposition 3, we know that rA =
k
9
(
4θk
9
) θ
1−θ and rB =
(
4k
9
) 1
1−θ
[
θ
θ
1−θ − θ 11−θ
]
. From
this we have that rA ≷ rB if and only if 14θ
(
4θk
9
) 1
1−θ ≷
(
1
θ
− 1) (4θk
9
) 1
1−θ or, equivalently, if
and only if θ ≷ 3
4
.
Discussion of Proposition 4. Proposition 4 shows that the level of public good provision
is suboptimal under relaxed tax competition. In the Corollary to Proposition 2 we showed
that ineﬃciency arises under relaxed tax competition because ﬁrms locate in more than one
jurisdiction. Here we have a second component to the ineﬃciency that arises under relaxed
tax competition in that the public good is under-provided in the high-tax jurisdiction. This
suboptimality arises because some ﬁrms locate in Jurisdiction A and so the marginal beneﬁt
to a policy maker is lower, whether this policy market is the planner or the Leviathan
government. To see this, ﬁrst recall from the eﬃcient solution that if τA = τB and xA =
xEA = 0 and xB = x
E
B then all ﬁrms locate in Jurisdiction B. It is easy to show that if
τA = τB were ﬁxed (or ‘harmonized’) at Stage 2, then Government B’s incentive to set
xB is identical to that of the planner, and it would set xB = x
E
B. Consequently, all ﬁrms
would be attracted to B. Conversely, if the planner were somehow constrained to set taxes
τ ∗A =
1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ and τ ∗B =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ , the outcome of relaxed tax competition, then the
planner’s solution to the level of public good provision would be xB = x
∗
B.
37We conjecture that this property, governments making positive rents in equilibrium, would hold for a
more general speciﬁcation for the proﬁt function in that the term kx θi could be replaced by a general function
b (xi; θ, k), with b (·) concave in xi and ∂b/∂k > 0.
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We are also able to see quite clearly the eﬀect of θ on the suboptimality of public good
provision. We do this by calculating the ratio of the level of public good provision at
equilibrium and eﬃcient levels in Jurisdiction B; x∗B/x
E
B =
8
9
1
1−θ . Observe that x∗B/x
E
B → 89
as θ → 0 and x∗B/xEB → 0 as θ → 1. We noted above that the eﬀect of an increase in θ on x∗B
and xEB may be ambiguous. Recall from Figure 2, for example, that an increase in θ could
bring about an increase in x∗B and x
E
B at θ relatively close to 0 but a decrease in x
∗
B and x
E
B
at θ relatively close to 1. From Proposition 4 it becomes evident that there is a systematic
eﬀect of θ on x∗B relative to x
E
B in spite of the ambiguous eﬀect of θ on the levels of x
∗
B and
xEB.
As a ﬁnal point note that both xEB and x
∗
B go to 0 as k goes to zero. This is plausible
since the public good does not save costs as k tends to zero so no ﬁrm will pay for it, and so
no jurisdiction will (or should) provide it.
5 Policies of Tax Coordination
The two most commonly advanced proposals for tax policy coordination are tax harmoniza-
tion and the setting of a minimum tax. Most of this section will be concerned with analysis
of a minimum tax, as tax harmonization in the context of our model is very straight forward.
We consider tax harmonization ﬁrst.
5.1 Tax Harmonization
Tax harmonization at its simplest imposes the requirement that both jurisdictions set the
same tax rate. Within the present model, the outcome of tax harmonization is obvious.
Recall from the discussion following Proposition 4 that if taxes are harmonized then Gov-
ernment B’s incentive to set xB is identical to that of the planner, and it sets xB = x
E
B.
The outcome from tax harmonization is that all ﬁrms locate in Jurisdiction B and that
Government B sets public good provision at the eﬃcient level. Without the imposition of a
revenue-sharing requirement, Government B would collect all rents under tax harmonization.
Thus, Government B’s rents would certainly rise under harmonization relative to relaxed tax
competition and Government A’s rents would certainly fall.
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5.2 A Minimum Tax
If governments agree to set a minimum tax, denoted by µ, then they agree to a common
lower bound for taxes. Within the context of our model there is no unique minimum tax
on which governments will agree. Therefore we characterize the non-renegotiable minimum
tax frontier as the set of minimum taxes for which, given a minimum tax on the frontier:
(i) neither government can obtain higher rent by a change in the minimum tax without the
other government having to accept lower rent; (ii) both governments obtain higher rents
than with no minimum tax.38 Given any minimum tax on the frontier, the two governments
would not jointly agree to renegotiate to any other minimum tax or to abolish the minimum
tax. The determination of the speciﬁc minimum tax that is implemented on the frontier
would depend on factors beyond the scope of our model.
A minimum tax only imposes a binding constraint if µ ≥ τ ∗A. On the other hand, µ
can be set suﬃciently high to ensure that tax rates are harmonized. By inspection of (1),
it is clear that if the constraint sets a minimum such that τA = τB then all ﬁrms locate in
Jurisdiction B. Since rents for A are zero if the share of ﬁrms that locates in A is zero, a
value of µ higher than the value required to ensure τA = τB cannot yield higher rents for A
than with no minimum tax. Therefore, we may restrict attention to µ that lies between τ ∗A
and a value that ensures τA = τB.
39
An issue that arises is whether a minimum tax should be applied when jurisdictions
are ex-ante symmetric; that is, when xA = xB. Here we take the view that the primary
motivation for a minimum tax is to reduce the diﬀerence between tax levels only when
jurisdictions would otherwise set diﬀerent taxes in equilibrium, motivated by the fact that
they provide public goods at diﬀerent levels. When jurisdictions provide public goods at the
same level, arguably this motivation for a minimum tax does not apply.40 Thus, we maintain
38The notion of the non-negotiable minimum tax frontier is related to the Pareto eﬃcient frontier. The
key diﬀerence is that the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier is deﬁned by the outcome of strategic
interactions between the two governments and, as we shall see, is not Pareto eﬃcient.
39For reasons that will become clear, τ∗B does not impose the upper bound on µ, unlike in Kanbur and
Keen (1993).
40It could also be argued that the primary purpose of a minimum tax is to limit competition between the
governments, and that this applies when jurisdictions are ex ante symmetrical as well. A competition limiting
eﬀect will be a feature of the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier. But it will arise when the minimum
tax is designed to limit the extent to which a low-public-good jurisdiction can undercut a high-public-good
jurisdiction.
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the approach taken throughout the paper that if xA = xB in Stage 1 then tax competition
between governments in Stage 2 is characterized by standard Bertrand competition, and
taxes are competed to zero.
We now formalize a minimum tax under the assumption that xA < xB.
41 Tax setting
under the minimum tax is unaﬀected by whether or not the constraint is anticipated. Let µ
be set at a level ε above A’s equilibrium tax under relaxed tax competition;42
µ = τ ∗A + ε =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ ε.
Let τµA be the tax that Government A sets in the presence of the minimum tax. By the
concavity of rA in τA, the best Government A can do in the presence of the minimum tax
is to set τµA = µ. The tax set by Government B is determined by the reaction function
TB (τA) =
(
τA + k
(
x θB − x θA
))
/2 as τµB =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 1
2
ε. We can now see that if
ε = 2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
, then τµA = τ
µ
B. Therefore, we restrict attention to ε ∈
[
0, 2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)]
.
To agree upon a minimum tax, the governments must eﬀectively agree upon a value for ε.
There are similarities here to Kanbur and Keen’s (1993) approach to the analysis of a
minimum tax. However, an issue that Kanbur and Keen do not need to address is how
the introduction of the minimum tax aﬀects the sequence of events. Their game only has a
single period. The minimum tax is imposed before tax setting takes place within that period,
bringing about a constrained equilibrium. In the model of this present paper, the imposition
of a minimum tax constraint raises the extra issue of whether the constraint is anticipated
before the level of public good provision is ﬁxed. From a purely theoretical standpoint, it
seems natural to argue that the imposition of the constraint is fully anticipated when levels
of public good provision are determined. In an applied context, on the other hand, it might
be argued that proposals for a minimum tax could take place after public good provision
has been ﬁxed. The context we have in mind here is the current call for a minimum tax in
the newly expanded EU. In the following we will examine both assumptions in two separate
subsections. We will examine the assumption that the minimum tax is not anticipated
ﬁrst, in Section 5.2.1, because it is analytically easier to deal with. In Section 5.2.2 we
41The case where xB < xA is analogous. In demonstrating equilibrium we take the same approach as
in Section 4.2, initially dropping the assumption that xA < xB . After it is established that in equilibrium
one government must set public good provision at a higher level than the other then the assumption that
xA < xB may be adopted without loss of generality.
42See Proposition 2, Section 4.1, for the determination of τ∗A.
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assume instead that the minimum tax is anticipated. In fact, our ﬁndings are qualitatively
independent of whether the constraint is anticipated or not.
5.2.1 Minimum Tax Unanticipated
In this subsection we assume that the governments set the levels of public good provision
simultaneously and noncooperatively at Stage 1 as if no minimum tax were to be imposed,
anticipating instead that the game would proceed straight to Stage 2 in which tax setting
would take place. After levels of public good provision are ﬁxed in Stage 1, the governments
are then unexpectedly granted the opportunity to agree upon a minimum tax. After the
minimum tax is agreed upon, the game then proceeds to Stage 2, at which point governments
set taxes simultaneously and noncooperatively (but now subject to the minimum tax).
Writing the respective levels of public good provision under the unanticipated minimum
tax constraint as xµA and x
µ
B we therefore have x
µ
A = x
∗
A = 0 and x
µ
B = x
∗
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ . Using
xµA = x
∗
A = 0, x
µ
B = x
∗
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ , τµA = µ = τ
∗
A + ε =
1
3
k (xµB)
θ
+ ε and τµB =
2
3
k (xµB)
θ
+ 1
2
ε
in the expressions for sˆ, rA, and rB, (that is 1, 4 and 5), we obtain the following reduced
form expressions for government rents. To emphasize that rents are being derived under the
minimum tax, we shall write these as rµA (ε) and r
µ
B (ε) respectively:
rµA (ε) =
1
9
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
+
1
6
ε− ε
2k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
) ;
rµB (ε) =
4
9
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
−
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
+
2
3
ε +
ε2
4k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
.
We now characterize the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier.
Proposition 5. Fix xµA = 0 and x
µ
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ and ﬁx a minimum tax µ = 1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+
ε. Then Government A maximizes rA (ε) by setting τ
µ
A =
1
3
k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
)
+ε and Government
B maximizes rB (ε) by setting τ
µ
B =
2
3
k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
)
+ 1
2
ε. A minimum tax is on the non-
renegotiation minimum tax frontier if ε ∈
(
1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , 1
3
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ
)
.
If the minimum tax is set such that ε ∈
[
1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , 1
3
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ
)
then both gov-
ernments make higher rents than with no minimum tax, and any change in the minimum
tax will yield strictly higher rents for one government but strictly lower rents for the other
government. To see this, ﬁrst note by inspection that rµB (ε) is monotonically increasing
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in ε. A little more work tells us that rµA (ε) is strictly concave in ε, with maximum at
ε = 1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ . Thus rµA (ε) is strictly decreasing, and r
µ
B (ε) is strictly increasing, for all
ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ . Given that ε = 0 corresponds to a situation where there is no minimum
tax, it is easy to see that both A and B must make higher rents at ε = 1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ than
with no minimum tax. Also, since rµA (ε) is strictly decreasing in ε for ε >
1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , it
must be possible to ﬁnd a value for ε at which Government A makes the same rent as with
no minimum tax; rµA (ε) = r
µ
A (0). This value is ε =
1
3
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , which deﬁnes the upper
bound to the frontier.
The reason both governments are able to make higher rents is because the minimum tax
further relaxes tax competition. While obviously the assumption that the minimum tax is
unanticipated is restrictive, we see now why it is useful. By holding the level of public good
provision constant, we are able to see the direct eﬀect on taxes and hence rents of introducing
the minimum tax. Using (1) it is possible to check that while A beneﬁts from being able to
set higher taxes, it loses ﬁrms as ε is increased. As ε is increased above ε = 1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ ,
the loss to A from the migration of ﬁrms to B is greater than the gain from being able to
tax each ﬁrm at a higher level. We shall see in Section 5.2.2 that this eﬀect carries over to
the situation where governments anticipate the introduction of the minimum tax.
5.2.2 Minimum Tax Anticipated
In the following, we show that even when the minimum tax is anticipated, rents for the
respective governments have the same qualitative characterization as in Section 5.2.1 where
public good provision was ﬁxed. Speciﬁcally, rB (0, x
µ
B (ε)) is monotonically increasing in ε
while rA (0, x
µ
B (ε)) is concave in ε with a unique optimum that deﬁnes the lower bound of
the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier.
We assume that the imposition of the minimum tax is anticipated before the start of
Stage 1, so each government takes the minimum tax into account when determining the
level of public good provision. Thus, the minimum tax is agreed upon after which the
sequence of events is exactly as in Section 4. Best response taxes with the minimum tax
are as follows: if xB > xA then τ
µ
A =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ ε and τµB =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 1
2
ε; on
the other hand if xA > xB then τ
µ
A =
2
3
k
(
x θA − x θB
)
+ 1
2
ε and τµB =
1
3
k
(
x θA − x θB
)
+ ε. If
xA = xB then τ
µ
A = τ
µ
B = 0. But now the levels of public good provision xA and xB are
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determined optimally in Stage 1. Using these expressions for τµA and τ
µ
B, Government A’s
rent function is deﬁned as follows for ε ∈ [0, 2
3
k
∣∣x θB − x θA ∣∣]:
rµA (xA, xB; ε) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
9
k
(
x θB − x θA
)− xA + 16ε− 12k(x θB −x θA )ε2 if 0 ≤ xA < xB;
−xA if 0 ≤ xA = xB;
4
9
k
(
x θA − x θB
)− xA + 23ε + 14k(x θA −x θB )ε2 if 0 ≤ xB < xA.
(6)
For Government B,
rµB (xA, xB; ε) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
4
9
k
(
x θB − x θA
)− xB + 23ε + 14k(x θB −x θA )ε2 if 0 ≤ xA < xB ;
−xB if 0 ≤ xA = xB;
1
9
k
(
x θA − x θB
)− xB + 16ε− 12k(x θA −x θB )ε2 if 0 ≤ xB < xA.
(7)
As was the case for when there was no minimum tax, when it maximizes rµA (xA, xB; ε) a
level of public good provision xµA (ε) of Government A is a best response against a level of
public good provision BRA (xB; ε).
43 A Nash equilibrium in levels of public good provision is
a pair (xµA (ε) , x
µ
B (ε)) where (i) x
µ
A (ε) is a best response against x
µ
B (ε) and vice-versa; (ii)
rµA (x
µ
A (ε) , x
µ
B (ε) ; ε) ≥ 0, rµB (xµA (ε) , xµB (ε) ; ε) ≥ 0.
The characterization of equilibrium is technically the same as discussed in Section 4.2 for
the case with no minimum tax; see the appendix for details. The equilibrium is asymmetric,
with one government providing no public good and the other providing the public good at a
positive level. As before, w.o.l.o.g. we let A be the jurisdiction with no public good provision
in equilibrium; xµA (ε) = 0. The top panel of Figure 3 shows a plot of x
µ
B (ε) while the bottom
panel shows sˆ (0, xµB (ε)) for k = 1 (and θ =
1
2
) as ε is varied.44 Note from the bottom panel
that sˆ (0, xµB (ε)) is increasing in ε and sˆ (0, x
µ
B (ε)) = 1 for ε =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
= 5
36
. Also
note that all values for ε = 0 correspond to equilibrium values given in Proposition 3. Thus,
at ε = 0, xµB (0) = x
µ
B =
(
2
9
)2
. The top panel shows that xµB (ε) decreases monotonically with
ε until the point where sˆ (0, xµB (ε)) = 1. Government B’s incentive to compete in public
good provision (by oﬀering the public good at a higher level than Government A) is reduced
by the fact that Government A is limited in the extent to which it is allowed to set its tax
lower than B’s.
Turning to Figure 4, we see that for k = 1, θ = 1
2
, rents for the respective governments
have the same qualitative characterization as in Section 5.2.1 where public good provision was
43Note the distinction we make between the best response function and rent function with and without
the minimum tax; the functions are shown to be dependent on the parameter ε in the former case.
44We have written sˆ (τA, τB , xA, xB) in the form sˆ (0, x
µ
B (ε)) to represent the fact that taxes τA = τ
µ
A and
τB = τ
µ
B have been determined as functions of x
µ
A (ε) = 0 and x
µ
B (ε).
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ﬁxed. Thus, as claimed, rB (0, x
µ
B (ε)) is monotonically increasing in ε while rA (0, x
µ
B (ε))
is concave in ε. The non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier is shown in Figure 4 as the
interval ε ∈ [ε, ε). The upper and lower bounds, ε and ε, are deﬁned in the same way as in
Proposition 5. For ε < ε both governments would agree to implement a higher minimum
tax. But for ε > ε, Government A makes higher rent with no minimum tax.
6 Conclusions
The main point of this paper has been to argue that when the value placed by ﬁrms on public
good provision varies, governments are able to use this fact to relax tax competition. The
fact that governments are able to relax tax competition may explain why governments in the
core of Europe, that have historically provided public goods at a relatively high level, have
been able to continue to tax at a higher level than those in the periphery even as markets
for goods and capital have become more integrated.
We show that public good provision in the high-tax jurisdictions is sub-optimally low
under tax competition, which accords with the conventional model of the standard tax
competition/‘race to the bottom’ literature. But, unlike with standard tax competition,
our model can also explain the often heard complaint that taxes are set too high, in the
sense that governments expropriate rents from ﬁrms in equilibrium. This arises out of the
monopolistic power that governments have because ﬁrms must locate in one jurisdiction or
another in order to produce.
The imposition of a minimum tax further relaxes the forces of tax competition. Both
governments make higher rents on the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier than without
a minimum tax. When the minimum tax is unanticipated, taxation is unambiguously higher
in both jurisdictions. When the minimum tax is anticipated our example shows that, where
provided, public good provision is even further below the eﬃcient level than without the
minimum tax. Our results on the minimum tax contrast with those of Kanbur and Keen
(1993) which suggest that countries are likely to gain from the imposition of a minimum tax.
Sutton (1991 Chapter 3) discusses the way that technology aﬀects equilibrium market
structure in models of vertical product diﬀerentiation. We can use Sutton’s discussion to
put our ﬁndings in context because the structure of our tax competition model conforms to
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the general structure of a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation. In this sense one might
say that we have a model of vertical public good diﬀerentiation, in which expenditure on
public goods may be thought of as a sunk cost.45
Sutton observes that if an increase in (perceived) product quality is achieved mainly by an
increase in a sunk cost then market concentration may increase with the size of the market.
As a stylized characterization of this, Shaked and Sutton (1982) show conditions under which
equilibrium will support no more than two ﬁrms because sunk costs are escalated with the
size of the market. The correspondence of product quality to the size of a sunk cost in a
model of vertical production diﬀerentiation is exactly analogous to the correspondence of the
level of public good provision to the size of the cost of provision in our tax competition model.
(In particular, note our assumption that the level of public good provision, and therefore its
cost, is determined in the ﬁrst stage of the game.) Therefore, extending Sutton’s conclusions
to the present context, even if we allowed jurisdictions to form endogenously as elsewhere in
the literature the basic characterization of the equilibrium that we demonstrate, being based
on just two jurisdictions, would not change.46
While we relate our model to recent European experience for which we present data
constructed by Devereux and Griﬃth (2003), our model may help to understand patterns
of taxation elsewhere as well. Mintz and Smart (2001) present and examine evidence that
corporate income tax rates have remained the same (or even increased slightly since 1986)
across provinces in Canada. More loosely, the variation in tax rates across states in the US
has attracted signiﬁcant media attention, with the spotlight focused on discrepancies between
jurisdictions where taxes and public good provision are relatively high, like Massachusetts,
and those where taxes and public good provision are at low levels, such as Alabama. Our
model, while focused on international taxation, puts forward a way of understanding these
patterns of variation in taxation across states as well, where federal transfers between states
45This is not to be confused with vertical tax competition discussed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), for
example, which relates to competition between governments at the ‘federal’ and ‘state’ levels.
46Sutton (1991) observes that if product quality is determined by a variable (and not a ﬁxed) cost, then
the number of ﬁrms becomes large with the size of the market, with the outcome converging to eﬃciency.
Analogously, the literature on Tiebout tax competition allows the number of jurisdictions to be endogenously
determined, with the outcome tending towards eﬃciency as the economy becomes large. See Wilson (1999)
and Wooders (1999) for comprehensive reviews. The link is made between the two literatures by noting that
in the Tiebout literature the level of public good provision is characterized by a variable cost, and not a
ﬁxed (sunk) cost as in the present model.
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are imperfect.
Although our model can explain in static terms why taxes and public good provision may
be higher in one jurisdiction than another, it is silent on the dynamics of how taxes have
evolved over time. While some commentators have taken evidence of falling taxes across
all countries to suggest that tax rates will eventually converge, our model suggests that the
long run equilibrium will exhibit diﬀerentiation in tax levels across countries. An agenda for
future research is to explain how average tax rates fall over time as markets become more
integrated while still maintaining a stable diﬀerential between the core and the periphery.
Our analysis may yield insights concerning the number and size of countries as well. A
feature of Alesina and Spolaore’s model is that the level of public good provision (or ‘the
government’ in their terminology) is the same across all jurisdictions, leading all countries to
be the same size in equilibrium.47 In the model of this present paper, by contrast, the level
of public good provision is determined endogenously and varies across the two jurisdictions
in the equilibrium under tax competition. Consequently, the sizes of the jurisdictions are
diﬀerent in equilibrium as well. The jurisdiction that provides the public good at the higher
level attracts a larger share of ﬁrms in equilibrium. This result is interesting because it
might have been expected that the low-tax jurisdiction would have attracted most of the
ﬁrms. It would be interesting to take this analysis further, and investigate how the relative
size of jurisdictions changes under alternative model speciﬁcations to get a better sense of
what determines the relative size of countries.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst derive the eﬃcient solution under the assumption that
xA < xB. We will then show that the eﬃcient solution cannot arise when xA = xB > 0.
Diﬀerentiate the planner’s problem (2) to obtain the ﬁrst and second order conditions
for an interior eﬃcient solution; that is, a solution in which xA < xB and sˆ ∈ (0, 1) by (1).
We shall see from these ﬁrst and second order conditions that the eﬃcient solution is in fact
obtained at sˆ = 0, and it will be obvious that the eﬃcient solution cannot occur at sˆ = 1.
47The result of Alesina and Spolaore that all countries are the same size in equilibrium rests partly on the
fact that individuals are uniformly distributed. They discuss informally the way in which their result would
change if individuals were not uniformly distributed.
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First, substitute the right hand side of (1) into (2) to obtain
max
τA,τB ,xA,xB
Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) = (p− c)− xA − xB + 1
2
(
kx θB −
(τB − τA)2
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
)
Then, under the assumption that xA < xB, it is easy to see that the ﬁrst and second
order conditions for τA are as follows:
∂Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂τA
=
τB − τA
k
(
x θB − x θA
) = 0;
and
∂2Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂τ 2A
= − 1
k
(
x θB − x θA
) < 0. (8)
Admitting corner solutions in taxes also requires that τB < τA. But in that case the outcome
is the same as for τB = τA because, by deﬁnition, sˆ = 0.
Next we have the same thing for τB:
∂Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂τB
= − τB − τA
k
(
x θB − x θA
) = 0;
and
∂2Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂τ 2A
= − 1
k
(
x θB − x θA
) < 0. (9)
Again, admitting corner solutions in taxes also requires that τB < τA. The second order
conditions in (8) and (9) show that Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) is concave in τA (holding τB constant)
and τB (holding τA constant). From the ﬁrst order condition, the eﬃcient solutions for taxes
is τEA = τ
E
B.
Now we introduce the eﬃcient condition for xA and xB. Take xA ﬁrst and so ﬁx xB > xA:
∂Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂xA
= −1− θx
θ−1
A (τB − τA)2
2k
(
x θB − x θA
)2 < 0
and
∂2Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂x2A
= −x
θ−2
B θ((θ − 1)x θB + (θ + 1) x θA )(τB − τA)2
2k
(
x θB − x θA
)3 . (10)
Next take xB and so ﬁx xA. Then for any xB > xA:
∂Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂xB
= −1 + θx
θ−1
B
2k
(
k2 +
(τB − τA)2(
x θB − x θA
)2
)
= 0 and
∂2Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB)
∂x2B
=
−
θ (xB)
θ−2
(
(1− θ) k2 (x θB − x θA )3 + ((1 + θ) x θB − (1− θ) x θA ) (τB − τA)2)
2k
(
x θB − x θA
)3 < 0. (11)
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Condition (10) shows that Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) is everywhere declining in xA and therefore
achieves a maximum when xA = 0 given xB > 0. The second order condition cannot
be signed unambiguously but this does not matter given that the ﬁrst order condition is
unambiguously negative.
Condition (11) shows that Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) is concave in xB and ensures a unique
eﬃcient level. It is immediate from (8) and (9) that the eﬃcient level of taxation is
obtained when τEA = τ
E
B. Using τ
E
A = τ
E
B in (10), ∂Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) /∂xA = −1 and
∂2Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) /∂x
2
A = 0 so Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) is maximized with respect to xA at
xA = 0. Using τ
E
A = τ
E
B in (11), setting ∂Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) /∂xA = 0 and solving in
terms of xEB we have that x
E
B =
(
1
2
) 1
1−θ (θk)
1
1−θ . In addition, it is clear by inspection that
∂2Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) /∂x
2
B < 0 for any xA < xB. Thus we have characterized the eﬃcient
solution as τEA = τ
E
B, xA = 0 and x
E
B =
(
1
2
) 1
1−θ (θk)
1
1−θ under the assumption that xA < xB.
It remains to show that eﬃciency cannot be increased by setting xA = xB > 0. In that
case, the value of sˆ depends on the value of τA relative to τB: If τA > τB then, by (1), sˆ = 0;
if τA < τB then sˆ = 1; if τA = τB then by assumption sˆ =
1
2
. Take each case in turn.
Suppose ﬁrst that eﬃciency is achieved for xA = xB and τA > τB. By (1), sˆ = 0 and so
by (2),
Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) = p− c− xA − xB + 1
2
(
kx θB
)
.
But eﬃciency could be increased by reducing xA; contradiction.
Next suppose that eﬃciency is achieved for xA = xB and τA < τB. By (1), sˆ = 1 and so
by (2),
Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) = p− c− xA − xB + 1
2
(
kx θA
)
.
But now eﬃciency could be increased by reducing xB; contradiction.
Finally, suppose that eﬃciency is achieved for xA = xB and τA = τB. By (1), sˆ =
1
2
and
so by (2),
Ω (τA, τB, xA, xB) = p− c− xA − xB + 1
2
(
1
2
kx θA +
1
2
kx θB
)
= p− c− xA − xB + 1
2
(
kx θB
)
where the second equality follows because xA = xB. But this is the same outcome as for
xA = xB and τA > τB, and for that case we saw that it was possible to increase eﬃciency
by reducing xA; contradiction. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Fix 0 ≤ xA < xB . To solve for τ ∗A, ﬁx τB ≥ 0. We want to solve
max
τA
rA (τA, τB) =
τA (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
) − xA.
First, looking at the second order condition, we see that
∂2rA/∂τ
2
A = −2/
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
< 0,
so rA (τA, τB) is everywhere concave with respect to τA. Setting the ﬁrst order condition
∂rA/∂τA = (−2τ ∗A + τB) /
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
equal to zero and rearranging in terms of τ ∗A ob-
tains τA (τB; xA, xB, k) = τB/2.
To solve for τ ∗B, ﬁx τA ≥ 0. Now we want to solve
max
τB
rB (τA, τB) = τB
(
1− (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
)
− xB.
Again, looking at the second order condition ﬁrst, we see that
∂2rB/∂τ
2
B = −2/
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
< 0,
so rB (τA, τB) is concave with respect to τB. Setting the ﬁrst order condition ∂rB/∂τB =
1 + (τA − 2τ ∗B) /
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
equal to zero and rearranging in terms of τB obtains the
result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For xA = xB both governments provide the same level of public
goods and we eﬀectively have a standard Bertrand equilibrium in homogeneous products.
Then sˆ = 1/2.
For xA < xB, by Lemma 1 for given τB, rA (τA, τB) is maximized by τ
∗
A = τB/2. For
given τA, rB (τA, τB) is maximized by τ
∗
B = τA/2 + k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/2. Solving simultaneously
obtains the reduced form expressions for τ ∗A (xA, xB; k) and τ
∗
B (xA, xB; k).
Using τ ∗A (xA, xB; k) = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3 and τ ∗B (xA, xB; k) = 2k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3 in sˆ =
(τB − τA) /k
(
x θB − x θA
)
obtains sˆ = 1/3. 
Proof of Proposition 3: To determine Government A’s set of best responses, we investigate
the properties of rA (xA, xB). It is clear by inspection of (4) that rA (xA, xB) achieves a
minimum at xA = xB. So we can rule out xA = xB from BRA (xB). Now observe that if
0 ≤ xA < xB then rA = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/9−xA so rA (xA, xB) is everywhere downward sloping
and convex over this range. Consequently, xA = 0 maximizes rA (xA, xB) for 0 ≤ xA < xB.
If on the other hand 0 ≤ xB < xA, then rA = 4k
(
x θA − x θB
)
/9 − xA, and rA (xA, xB)
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is everywhere strictly concave. Diﬀerentiating once, setting the result equal to zero and
rearranging, we ﬁnd that rA (xA, xB) has a unique maximum at xA =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ . Thus
BRA (xB) ∈
{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
. Because rB (xA, xB) has the same functional form as rA (xA, xB),
it follows that BRB (xA) ∈
{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
; see (5). Recall that rA (xA, xB) and rB (xA, xB)
achieve a minimum at xA = xB. So
(
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
)
is the only set of mutual best responses and
must therefore be a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, there are two Nash equilibria;
(
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
)
and
((
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ , 0
)
. But we may now assume, without loss of generality, that xA < xB. Then
(x∗A, x
∗
B) =
(
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
)
is the unique Nash equilibrium. Using these values to solve for
equilibrium taxes from Proposition 2, we have that τ ∗A =
1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ and τ ∗B =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ .
Thus we have proved the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Diﬀerentiate the planner’s problem (2), to obtain the ﬁrst order
condition; dΩ/dxB =
1
2
θkxθ−1B − 1. Setting this equal to 0 and solving for xB obtains xEB. 
Proof of Proposition 5. To see that rµA (ε) is concave in ε, diﬀerentiate r
µ
A (ε) once with
respect to ε to obtain
drµA (ε)
dε
=
1
6
− ε
k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
) .
Clearly, drµA (ε) /dε > 0 as ε → 0 and drµA (ε) /dε < 0 as ε becomes large. Also, drµA (ε) /dε
declines monotonically with ε. The unique value of ε that maximizes rµA is ε =
1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ .
By deﬁnition, a minimum tax for which ε < 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ cannot be on the frontier because
both governments make higher rents by increasing ε to ε = 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ ; thus we have deﬁned
the lower bound of the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier.
By deﬁnition, the minimum tax on the frontier must yield higher rents for both govern-
ments than no minimum tax. Because rµB (ε) increases monotonically with ε, B makes higher
rent with any minimum tax than with no minimum tax. However, rµA (ε) declines monoton-
ically with ε for ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ . Therefore, a level of ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ must exist at which
rµA (ε) = r
µ
A (0). It is easy to establish that r
µ
A (0) =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ . Then ε = 1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ is
the unique level of ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ at which rµA (ε) = r
µ
A (0); thus we have deﬁned the upper
bound of the non-renegotiable minimum tax frontier. 
Minimum Tax Anticipated: Characterization of Equilibrium. To determine Gov-
ernment A’s set of best responses with the minimum tax, we investigate the properties
of rµA (xA, xB; ε). First we check the range 0 ≤ xA < xB, over which rµA (xA, xB; ε) =
1
9
k
(
x θB − x θA
)−xA + 16ε− ε2/2k (x θB − x θA ). Taking the ﬁrst derivative, we have drA/dxA =
35
−1− θxθ−1A
(
2k2 + 9ε2/
(
x θB − x θA
)2)
/18k < 0; rµA (xA, xB; ε) is everywhere downward slop-
ing over the range 0 ≤ xA < xB. Now note that rµA (xA, xB; ε) > −xA at xA = xB > 0 for
ε ∈ (0, 2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
, and rµA (xA, xB; ε) = −xA at xA = xB > 0 for ε = 23k
(
x θB − x θA
)
.
We can conclude that rµA (xA, xB; ε) ≥ −xA for all ε as xA → xB from below. Consequently,
xA = 0 maximizes r
µ
A (xA, xB; ε) for the range 0 ≤ xA < xB and xA = 0 dominates xA = xB.
Thus xµA (ε) = 0 is the best response over the range 0 ≤ xA < xB.
If on the other hand 0 ≤ xB < xA, then rµA (xA, xB; ε) = 49k
(
x θA − x θB
) − xA + 23ε +
ε2/4k
(
x θA − x θB
)
. Taking the ﬁrst derivative, we have
drA/dxA = −1 + 4
9
kθxθ−1A
(
1− 9ε2/16 (x θA − x θB )2) .
We cannot solve explicitly for xµA (ε) over the range 0 ≤ xB < xA without specifying θ.
However, by specifying values of ε we can obtain a characterization of xµA (ε). To illus-
trate, ﬁx ε at its maximum admissible value ε = ε = 2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
, and substitute this
into the ﬁrst derivative. We have drA/dxA = −1 + 512kθxθ−1A . Setting the result equal to
zero and solving, we have xµA (ε) =
(
5
12
θk
) 1
1−θ . Then, following the same logic as in Sec-
tion 4.2 preceding Proposition 3, and using the assumption that xA < xB, we have that
(xµA (ε) , x
µ
B (ε)) =
(
0,
(
5
12
θk
) 1
1−θ
)
is the unique Nash equilibrium. Taxes are obviously the
same across jurisdictions for ε = ε, at τµA = τ
µ
B = k
(
5
12
θk
) θ
1−θ and sˆ = 1.
Notice that xµA (ε) =
(
5
12
θk
) 1
1−θ < xµA (0) =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ . More generally, by the implicit
function theorem we know that xµA (ε) may be treated as a continuous function of ε. It can
be established that xµA (ε) is inversely related to ε as ε is varied over the interval ε ∈ [0, ε] for
0 ≤ xB < xA. Following, once again. the same logic as in Section 4.2 preceding Proposition
3, we have that (xµA (ε) , x
µ
B (ε)) = (0, BRB (0; ε)) is the unique Nash equilibrium (given that
xA < xB).
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We want to go one step further, and investigate the behavior of rA (0, BRB (0; ε) ; ε)
and rB (0, BRB (0; ε) ; ε) as ε is varied in order to determine the non-renegotiable minimum
tax frontier. While this cannot be done at a general level, it can be done for the speciﬁc
value θ = 1
2
, which we believe to be generally illustrative. We maintain the assumption
that xA < xB and solve for x
µ
B (ε). This root is very cumbersome to write down, and since
xµA (ε) = 0 is a dominant strategy for Government A we jump straight to the equilibrium
48By the same arguments as in Section 4.2, BRB (0; ε) = 0.
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value:
x∗B (ε) = 512 (−2)1/3 k8 − (−2)2/3 φ2/3 + 16k4
(
−2187 (−2)1/3 ε2 + 2φ1/3
)
/
(
1944φ1/3
)
where
φ = −8192k12 + 839808k8ε2 − 14348907k4ε4 + 59049
√
−768k12ε6 + 59049k8ε8.
This solution for xµB (ε) is illustrated for k = 1 in Figure 3 and used to deﬁne the non-
renegotiable minimum tax frontier illustrated in Figure 4.
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